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ABSTRACT
Antibiotic resistance is an increasing global problem. Surveillance studies are needed to monitor
resistance development, to guide local empirical therapy, and to implement timely and adequate
countermeasures. To achieve this, surveillance studies must have standardised methodologies, be
longitudinal, and cover a sufﬁciently large and representative population. However, many fall short of
these requirements that deﬁne good surveillance studies. Moreover, current efforts are dispersed among
many, mostly small, initiatives with different objectives. These studies must be tailored to the various
reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, such as hospitalised patients, nursing homes, the community,
animals and food. Two studies that could serve as examples of tailored programmes are the European
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS), which collects resistance data during the
diagnosis of hospitalised patients, and the DANMAP programme, which collects data in the veterinary
sector. As already noted by the WHO, genetic studies that include both the typing of isolates and the
characterisation of resistance determinants are necessary to understand fully the spread and
development of antibiotic resistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Resistance to antibiotics is an increasing global
concern. Data concerning antibiotic resistance are
obtained via surveillance studies, which have
been described as ‘the ongoing and systematic
collection, analysis, and interpretation of health
data in the process of describing and monitoring a
health event’ [1]. Since resistance development is
an evolutionary process, constant surveillance is
necessary to gain insight into the problem in a
timely fashion. Regional studies are also required
because of the frequent differences in incidence
among different regions.
The basic objectives of surveillance studies of
resistance among microorganisms are to deter-
mine the level of resistance in a particular geo-
graphical area in order to monitor changes in the
level of resistance and to make this information
available to therapeutic decision-makers in a
time-frame that maximises appropriate prescrip-
tion of antimicrobial agents, to detect new mech-
anisms of resistance for use as early warning
signs, to study how such resistance develops,
persists and spreads, and to monitor interven-
tions [2–5]. This review considers the limitations
of current antibiotic resistance surveillance pro-
grammes and discusses possible approaches




There are many different kinds of surveillance
programmes: some focus on local or national
data, while others have an international focus;
some monitor only one bacterial species or infec-
tion; some are small-scale, whereas others are
large-scale efforts; some are funded by industry,
while others are coordinated by non-proﬁt organ-
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isations (Table 1). Although some programmes,
e.g., The Alexander Project and the SENTRY
Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme, have
overcome many of the above limitations [6,7],
and despite the large number of programmes,
little is known about the resistance situation in
certain reservoirs, including nursing homes, kin-
dergartens, food, the veterinary sector, the envi-
ronment and pets.
A certain sample bias is present in every
surveillance system, because different criteria
are used by different physicians when selecting
patients for microbiological investigation [8,9]. In
addition, since isolates or data may be used in
several studies, there are dangers in concaten-
ating results or comparing the studies [10]. The
longitudinal component of these studies may also
be a problem, in that some centres may withdraw
from a multicentre study. The problem of biased
isolate inclusion is even greater for surveys of
antibiotic resistance in the community. Usually,
only samples from patients with persistent infec-
tions or infections refractory to treatment are
referred to a central laboratory by a general
practitioner, and it is not clear how representative
these isolates are of strains causing community-
acquired infections in general. Therefore, neither
hospitals nor isolates may give a clear represen-
tative perspective of the global danger of resist-
ance. Although longitudinal studies that include
the same hospitals and types of isolates give some
indication concerning trends, it is risky to provide
guidance to clinicians for empirical antibiotic
therapy based on this information, because of
differences at the local level. Therefore, local
resistance data must be available to physicians
working in hospitals; regional data concerning
community pathogens must be available to gen-
eral practitioners; and national data must be
available to healthcare policy-makers. Moreover,
European and worldwide data must be freely
available to all to provide early warning signs.
One example of the need for a global information
system is vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus. To date, there have been three reports of
true vancomycin-resistant S. aureus [11–13], and
because such bacteria pose a serious health-threat,
early warning is very important.
Good-quality susceptibility data are essential to
detect trends, as well as new and rare resistance
phenotypes. Unfortunately, the quality of resist-
ance data, especially from clinical laboratories, is
often questionable [13–16]. Quality control of the
susceptibility data is therefore crucial. A further
complication in Europe is the use of different
deﬁnitions for ‘resistant’: i.e., when is an isolate
Table 1. Examples of different types of antimicrobial resistance surveillance study
Study Target population Objective Duration Reference









Croatian Committee for Antibiotic Surveillance Not given Diverse Not given [31]
ECO-SENS Community Acute uncomplicated urinary
tract infections
1 year [32]
GEIH-BLEE (extended-spectrum b-lactamases in
Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae in Spain)
Hospital ESBLs 4 months [33]
Gram-negative isolates from intensive care units in Turkey ICU Gram-negative isolates At least 5 years [34]
Italian Epidemiological Observatory Community Streptococcus pneumoniae 3 years [35]










SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme Community
and hospital
General 1997a [7]
South Swedish Pneumococcal Intervention Project All patients Penicillin-resistant pneumococi 3 years [38]
Surveillance of Antibiotic Use and Resistance in German Intensive
Care Units (SARI)
ICU 13 sentinel pathogens 2000a [39]
Swedish Strategic Programme for the Rational Use of Antimicrobials Patients Reduction of antibiotic use ? [40]
Global Project on Anti-Tuberculosis Drug Resistance Surveillanceb Patients Mycobacterium tuberculosis 1994a c
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; ICU, intensive care unit.
aOngoing; year of start is given.
bA WHO project in which many organisations and nations are participating with their own local surveillance schemes.
chttp://www.who.int/drugresistance/tb/en/.
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‘susceptible’, ‘intermediately-resistant’ or ‘resist-
ant’ to an antibiotic?
With few exceptions, surveillance efforts in the
veterinary sector are limited and the different
programmes are not coordinated. Furthermore,
the criteria for testing isolates differ widely
among countries, as do the antimicrobial agents
tested. As a result, there is no clear picture of the
extent of antibiotic resistance among isolates of
veterinary origin [9]. The same is true for isolates
from food; in many cases, it is only in following
cases of food poisoning that an attempt is made to
track antibiotic-resistant isolates to their source.
The cost of adequate surveillance, despite the
issue of food safety, and the small proﬁt margins
in the veterinary sector make the ﬁnancing of
surveillance in the veterinary and agriculture
sectors difﬁcult. Finally, although antibiotic-
resistant isolates have been described, no major
efforts have been made to assess the reservoirs
formed by pets and the environment.
An additional problem is the limited availability
of genetic data concerning antibiotic resistance. In
most cases, it is unknown whether the spread of
resistance is caused by the clonal spread of a
resistant strain, or by the horizontal transfer of
resistance determinants among different strains
and species. Reference centres have responsibility
in this area, but are often not well-equipped or
supported to perform such research. Despite (e.g.)
the HARMONY [17], GENE [18], CAMPYNET
(http://campynet.vetinst.dk) and PULSENET
(http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/) projects, in
which a start has been made on the development
and implementation of standardised and
exchangeable typing methods to monitor clonal
expansion, more work needs to be done in this
ﬁeld. A major problem is that standardised pro-
tocols are not implemented in all studies, and that
testing for clonal spread is limited because it is
costly and time-consuming. Another problem is
that the spread of antibiotic resistance through
horizontal transfer is rarely monitored. This
includes spread among different reservoirs. Some
surveillance programmes have reported data on a
limited number of isolates and resistance deter-
minants, but no large-scale structured efforts have
been made to study such spread. The WHO
recently identiﬁed this lack of information con-
cerning microbial genetics and ecology in antimi-
crobial-resistant bacteria as a gap in current
knowledge and hence a key need [3].
Although the optimal criteria for good surveil-
lance programmes have been well-established in
the scientiﬁc literature [4], practice shows that this
ideal has not been achieved. Two main causal
factors have been identiﬁed: lack of ﬁnancial
resources and lack of standardised methods.
Despite the limitations of current and past surveil-
lance programmes, much has been learnt regard-
ing antibiotic resistance among pathogens such as
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, S. aureus, Vibrio choler-
ae, Salmonella and the other Enterobacteriaceae,
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, pneumococci and entero-
cocci [19]. However, surveillance remains vital for
several reasons. The ﬁrst is that the demographics
of the European Union (EU) are changing as a
result of immigration and an aging population.
Most immigrants to the EU come from non-
Western countries, where resistance levels in bac-
teria are generally higher.Moreover, the increasing
number of elderly individuals in the population
will result in increased numbers of severely-ill
patients (e.g., those suffering from cancer), who
will often require more intensive and longer care,
both of which are risk-factors for the acquisition of
multiresistant microorganisms. Another reason is
that supplies of fresh food are obtained not only
from the EUbut,with increasing globalisation, also
from parts of the world where antibiotic resistance
levelsmaybehigher andwhere different resistance
determinants may be present.
It is clear that improved surveillance is re-
quired to understand and deal with the problem
of antimicrobial resistance. The remainder of this
review discusses a broad approach and makes
suggestions for monitoring antibiotic resistance.
For this purpose, the reservoirs of antibiotic
resistance have been divided into three groups:
hospitalised patients; the veterinary sector; and
other reservoirs. Each group requires its own




Since many surveillance studies are carried out by
large (often university) hospitals, very few, if any,
data are available concerning resistance levels in
smaller hospitals. Moreover, the current surveil-
lance programmes, both large- and small-scale,
include only a limited number of hospitals and a
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small number of isolates. One approach to over-
come this problem would be to have all isolates
tested in a central reference laboratory. In this
way, each isolate could be analysed using the
same methods, interpretation criteria and rigor-
ous quality control. However, the logistics and
cost of shipment are prohibitive for such a
proposal. A better approach would be to send
the susceptibility data for isolates from each
patient to a reference centre, and ensure that
these data are quality-controlled.
In the short term, all large hospitals should
provide annual reports on resistance levels. The
programme and criteria set by the European
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System
(EARSS) may be a useful starting point. The
objective of the EARSS is to amass and summarise
comparable and reliable antimicrobial resistance
data to beneﬁt public health across Europe, taking
into account laboratory methods as well as epi-
demiological principles [20]. However, the EARSS
is limited by the number of microorganisms and
participating hospitals. A good approach, there-
fore, would be to collect data for a larger number
of microorganisms from all EU member states for
analysis by a central organisation, which might
become part of the European Centre of Disease
Control (ECDC).
The initial focus should be on intensive care
units, haematology wards and transplantation
wards, because resistance levels are highest in
these settings. In the long term, this focus needs to
be extended to smaller hospitals. Whatever
approach is chosen, the data should be made
available to each hospital and to each ward in the
hospital. This will not only guide empirical
therapy, but will also help to formulate antibiotic
policies to minimise or overcome antibiotic resist-
ance in particular wards or hospitals, either by
intervention [21], or by other changes in antibiotic
use.
Standardised methodology yielding quantita-
tive data to enable the detection of small shifts in
susceptibility would be ideal, but this cannot be
achieved in practice, because a number of differ-
ent techniques exist for antibiotic susceptibility
determinations (e.g., VITEK, Phoenix, Walkaway,
disk-diffusion assays). Nevertheless, data ob-
tained with these techniques should be compar-
able, so that the results can be collated among
different laboratories, and can also be used for
historical comparison when laboratories change
their antimicrobial susceptibility testing tech-
niques (e.g., from a manual to an automated
system). Quality control is therefore of extreme
importance. Organisations that provide external
quality control already exist (e.g., NEQAS,
EARTHNET), but operate on a voluntary basis
and with contributions from the participants. A
much larger effort is required to monitor the
performance of all laboratories providing antibi-
otic resistance surveillance data. Perhaps it can be
based on the good example of effectively ad-
dressed quality control issues found in the EARSS
programme [8,22]. The EU should help to fund
these activities.
Another area that needs attention is the deﬁni-
tion of the criteria that are used to report isolates
as resistant, intermediately-resistant or suscept-
ible. Fortunately, EUCAST (the European Com-
mittee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing; a
standing committee of the European Society for
Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases),
which was formed to standardise susceptibility
testing in Europe, is making progress in this ﬁeld.
If the above suggestions are followed, the organ-
isation responsible for collecting surveillance data
can then ensure coherence in thepresentationof the
results. Regional, national and European data can
be used to map the spread of particular antibiotic-
resistant strains, and to raise awareness of the
existence of such strains. This is particularly neces-
sary because patients admitted to hospitals abroad
are being transferred with increasing frequency
back to hospitals in their home country. Know-
ledge concerning antibiotic resistance levels in the
ﬁrst hospital can guide empirical therapy and be a
reason for additional hospital infection control
measures.
The veterinary sector
Intensive husbandry, with its crowded conditions
and large numbers of animals, creates a favour-
able environment for the spread of infectious
disease. Although antimicrobial agents are re-
quired to control disease, they also exert pressure
for the selection of both antibiotic-resistant path-
ogens and antibiotic-resistant commensal ﬂora. It
is clear that these resistant organisms are a threat
to both human and animal health, either directly
by causing disease or as a reservoir of resistance
genes. The transport of animals and meat
throughout Europe also promotes the spread of
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resistant isolates (http://europe.eu.int/comm/
food/fs/sc/ssc/out50_en.pdf).
A number of European countries, including
Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, The
Netherlands and the UK, have some form of
surveillance of veterinary isolates, or have con-
ducted at least some surveillance studies in the
veterinary ﬁeld. However, the most extensive
programme is in Denmark. The Danish Integrated
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Re-
search Programme (DANMAP) addresses the
problem of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in animals,
food and humans [23]. The programme has four
objectives: to monitor trends in resistance among
bacteria from animals, food and humans; to
monitor the consumption of antimicrobial agents
in animals; to determine the association between
consumption and the occurrence of resistance; and
to model the transmission of resistance from
animals to humans. The programme examines
representative isolates of human and animal
pathogens, zoonotic bacteria and indicator bac-
teria. Animal isolates are derived from both
healthy and diseased animals, and the antibiotics
are representative of the major classes of antibi-
otic. Furthermore, antibiotic consumption data are
collected for food animals according to the VET-
STAT programme and are recorded for each herd.
Ideally, the veterinary sector should follow the
DANMAP ⁄VETSTAT approach. An important
route for infections and possible transfer of
resistance is via food. Therefore, improved micro-
bial food safety will reduce the number of
episodes of food poisoning, and thereby the need
for treatment and the opportunity for transfer of
resistance. In order to achieve improved microbial
food safety, the continued development of alter-
native methods of animal husbandry in the
veterinary sector, with reduced or optimised use
of antimicrobial agents, will be necessary.
Other reservoirs
Surveillance of antibiotic resistance in the com-
munity requires additional measures besides the
reporting of data obtained from central general
practitioner laboratories. A well-designed surveil-
lance system should also include patients who
receive an antibiotic prescription, but who do not
return with the same infection. Such data may be
obtained, in part, from hospital reports when a
distinction between community-acquired and
hospital-acquired infections is made. Such a
dedicated approach is also needed for other
human reservoirs of resistance, such as kinder-
gartens and nursing homes.
A separate issue concerns the surveillance of
resistance in patients discharged from hospital.
Currently, the contribution of such patients to the
problem of antibiotic resistance in general, and in
the community in particular, is largely unknown.
Studies should include both family members and
pets in order to determine the ability of resistant
bacteria, or resistance determinants, to spread to
presumably healthy individuals and animals.
The fact that antimicrobial agents are also used
in plant protection is not appreciated widely, but
antibiotics are used frequently to combat plant
pathogens. Resistance to kasugamycin, strepto-
mycin, chloramphenicol, cellocidin and oxytetra-
cycline has been reported, but no data are
available for Europe [20,24,25]. Plant pathogens
are not known to be pathogenic to humans;
however, vegetables and fruits are contaminated
frequently with faecal bacteria from animal
manure. This can lead to the direct infection of
consumers, e.g., with Escherichia coli O157:H7.
Vegetables and fruits can also be a source of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria that contribute their
resistance determinants to the gene pool already
present in human and animal microbial ﬂora.
Finally, resistance has been found to compromise
the effectiveness of antibiotics used in plant
protection [26,27].
Dedicated programmes are required to assess
antibiotic resistance and the gene pool of food,
pets and the environment.
GENETIC STUDIES
Currently, it is impossible to characterise the
resistance determinants present in all resistant
isolates at the genetic level. Genetic characterisa-
tion of resistance determinants should therefore be
part of dedicated research programmes and com-
bined with surveillance programmes in reservoirs
such as kindergartens, nursing homes and agri-
culture. Similarly, genetic typing of isolates should
be performed to determine the contribution of
clonal spread. In human medicine, typing of the
antibiotic-resistant isolates is good medical prac-
tice, because such data are required for effective
hospital infection control. However, it would be
worthwhile to harmonise typing methods further;
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such methods should be reproducible among
laboratories and data should be made available
via the internet for comparison in order to identify
strains that are particularly epidemic. As noted
above, several initiatives have been taken to
standardise typing methods and facilitate the
comparison of typing proﬁles established in dif-
ferent laboratories. Nevertheless, more needs to be
done, and speciﬁc tests should be developed to
monitor particular clones. The organisation of
typing databases could be combined in a centre
that collates antibiotic resistance surveillance data.
In addition, dedicated programmes to characterise
the resistance gene pool are required to assess the
risk for acquiring resistance genes or the organ-
isms carrying these determinants.
OTHER SUGGESTIONS
The development of new antibiotic resistance–
species combinations should be followed critically
and a reporting system established. This is espe-
cially true for new classes of antibiotics. The
observation of a new type of resistance should be
followed immediately by research into the mech-
anism of resistance. This information should then
serve as the basis for measures to prevent the
spread of the strain and ⁄ or the resistance deter-
minant. Isolates ﬁtting particular resistance pro-
ﬁles should then be referred to designated
laboratories for further analysis. These reference
laboratories should be reimbursed for the costs.
Final responsibility should reside with the ECDC.
The linkage of surveillance data to antibiotic
consumption data could provide a useful impetus
for the control of antibiotic resistance. Modelling
of resistance and antibiotic consumption is
required to provide tools to predict the impact
of interventions on the hospital ward, local,
national and international levels. The use of
appropriate surveillance data and mathematical
modelling appear to be attractive options to
describe this relationship [28,29].
An important issue concerns the ownership of
surveillance data. Data at a hospital level can be
the property of the hospital, but data aggregated
on a regional, national or European level could
belong to the ECDC. In this respect, the dissem-
ination of data is also important, because the
information is not only interesting from a scien-
tiﬁc viewpoint, but also provides important mar-
keting data. The pharmaceutical industry should
therefore be involved in surveillance studies. One
speciﬁc area could involve the testing of newly
introduced antibiotics. Routine surveillance test-
ing does not include new(er) antibiotics because
resistance is expected to be low. Contributions by
the pharmaceutical industry could help to imple-
ment testing of new antibiotics quickly. Finally,
knowledge of the link between resistance data
and antibiotic consumption is very valuable for
the pharmaceutical industry. As a result, antibi-
otic resistance surveillance should be supported
ﬁnancially, not only by hospitals, but also by the
EU and the pharmaceutical industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Many of the surveillance studies conducted to
date have generally been unable to fulﬁl the
objectives of antibiotic surveillance. However,
several promising initiatives (e.g., EARSS and
DANMAP) have been taken to improve this
situation. Knowledge of some of the important
reservoirs is limited (e.g., in the veterinary sector)
or absent, and only scattered information regard-
ing the prevalence of different resistance deter-
minants in the various reservoirs is available. This
information is vital for the design of interventions
to limit the spread of antibiotic resistance. More-
over, genetic studies of the mechanisms of the
spread of bacteria and resistance determinants
should be facilitated and antibiotic surveillance
programmes should be coupled to antibiotic
usage. The resulting data should then be used to
model the development and spread of antibiotic
resistance. Finally, a European organisation is
required to collate the data obtained in surveil-
lance studies, and the issues of data ownership
and ﬁnancing should be addressed.
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